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Nontechnical Summary 
 
In 2009, Germany has introduced a new debt brake which aims at constraining the build-
up of new public debt for both the federal and the state level. While the new rule is en-
shrined in the federal constitution, the Grundgesetz, the sixteen states have leeway on 
how to mirror these national rules in their state constitutions and budgetary state laws.  
It is the objective of this contribution to shed light on this issue and to ask to which 
extent German states’ debt rules differ. Germany is without doubt an important example 
of debt rule federalism since the German debt brake has had a strong impact on the de-
sign of the rules agreed upon in the European Fiscal Compact. In our analysis we go 
beyond a mere qualitative description of institutional differences and develop a quantita-
tive indicator which expresses the strictness of the debt rules. The indicator’s construc-
tion follows approaches developed in the current literature to compare the strictness of 
fiscal rules across countries. 
Our results point towards a considerable heterogeneity of budgetary rules across 
German states in spite of the existence of the overall federal constitutional rule. For ex-
ample, states differ with respect to the legal basis of their debt rules, the rule’s precision, 
the chosen flexibility provisions and its comprehensiveness. Furthermore, only in the 
poorest states the rules’ credibility gains from effective sanction provisions as these 
states risk the loss of transfers if they do not adhere to the rules. This partially explains 
that, according to our indicator, the strongest rules are currently to be found in financially 
weak states (Schleswig-Holstein, Saxony-Anhalt and Saarland). However, this ad-
vantage will partially expire in the year 2020 when the financial consolidation support 
and with it the specific threat of sanctions end. 
From 2020 on, according to the current state of legislation Rhineland-Palatinate 
(index value of 0.78) has the strongest rule, followed by Saxony (0.67), Schleswig-
Holstein (0.67) and Hesse (0.66). Rhineland-Palatinate, Schleswig-Holstein and Hesse 
implemented the rule in their state constitutions. What makes Rhineland-Palatinate out-
standing is that its rule also covers special funds and public enterprises. This raises the 
index scores significantly. 
  
Some of the highly indebted states miss the chance of using their own legislation 
to make their fiscal regime more credible. This observation is in line with well-known dis-
incentives of German federalism. Germany’s federal jurisdictions form a full bail-out-
community. In this sense, the German experience with in several cases poor ambitions 
for state fiscal rules is another example of bad incentives in federal systems based on 
mutual bailout promises. 
 
Das Wichtigste in Kürze 
 
Deutschland hat im Jahr 2009 eine neue Schuldenbremse eingeführt. Diese zielt darauf 
ab, neue Schulden für den Bund und die Länder zu begrenzen. Obwohl die neue Schul-
denregel in der deutschen Verfassung, dem Grundgesetz, festgeschrieben ist, verfügen 
die sechzehn Bundesländer über Freiheitsgrade in der Umsetzung der nationalen Re-
geln in ihren eigenen Landesverfassungen und Landeshaushaltsordnungen. 
Ziel dieses Beitrags ist es, zu klären, in welchem Ausmaß sich die Schuldenre-
geln der deutschen Bundesländer unterscheiden. Deutschland ist zweifellos ein beson-
ders wichtiges Beispiel für Schuldenregel-Föderalismus, weil die deutsche Schulden-
bremse einen starken Einfluss auf die Vorschriften des europäischen Fiskalvertrags hat-
te. In unserer Analyse gehen wir über eine reine qualitative Beschreibung der institutio-
nellen Unterschiede hinaus und entwickeln einen quantitativen Indikator zur Messung 
der Stärke einer Schuldenregel. Die Indikatorkonstruktion folgt dabei Ansätzen, die in 
der existierenden Literatur zum Vergleich der Härte von Budgetregeln zwischen Staaten 
entwickelt worden sind. 
Unsere Ergebnisse deuten auf eine erhebliche Heterogenität der Budgetregeln 
für die deutschen Bundesländer trotz der föderalen Verfassungsregel hin. Die Bundes-
länder unterscheiden sich beispielsweise im Hinblick auf die Rechtsgrundlage, die Prä-
zision, die Flexibilitätsklauseln und die Vollständigkeit ihrer Schuldenregeln. Außerdem 
profitiert die Glaubwürdigkeit der Regeln nur in den ärmsten Staaten von effektiven 
Sanktionen, weil diese Staaten den Verlust von Transfers riskieren, wenn sie die Regeln 
missachten. Dies erklärt zum Teil, warum gegenwärtig die schärfsten Regeln in finanziell 
schwachen Bundesländern (Schleswig-Holstein, Sachsen-Anhalt und Saarland) zu fin-
  
den sind. Allerdings wird dieser Vorteil im Jahr 2020 teilweise verloren gehen, wenn die 
Konsolidierungshilfen und damit die konkreten Sanktionsdrohungen auslaufen. 
Ab 2020 wird nach der heutigen Rechtslage Rheinland-Pfalz (Indexwert 0,78) 
über die strengste Regel verfügen, gefolgt von Sachsen (0,67), Schleswig-Holstein 
(0,67) und Hessen (0,66). Rheinland-Pfalz, Schleswig-Holstein und Hessen haben die 
Regeln in ihren Verfassungen verankert. Die Regel von Rheinland-Pfalz sticht dadurch 
heraus, dass sie auch Sonderfonds und öffentliche Unternehmen abdeckt. Dies erhöht 
den Indexwert erheblich. 
Einige der stark verschuldeten Staaten vergeuden die Chance, durch eigene Ge-
setzgebung ihr Fiskalregime glaubwürdiger zu gestalten. Diese Beobachtung steht im 
Einklang mit den bekannten Fehlanreizen des deutschen Föderalismus. Deutschlands 
föderale Jurisdiktionen bilden eine vollständige Haftungsgemeinschaft. In diesem Sinn 
bietet Deutschlands Erfahrung mit wenig ambitionierten Fiskalregeln in einigen Bundes-
ländern einen weiteren Beleg für die falschen Anreize in föderalen Systemen, die auf 
wechselseitigen Haftungszusagen gründen. 
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1. Introduction 
Federal structures provide the potential that sub-national jurisdictions follow individual 
policies which, compared to a unitary government, can better be tailored according to 
heterogeneous voter preferences. This chance, however, may imply a risk when it 
comes to the need of credible and consistent country-wide constitutional rules. If a coun-
try tries to enhance its fiscal credibility through new budgetary rules, a transposition lee-
way of sub-national jurisdictions could weaken these rules’ effectiveness and credibility. 
This risk can be assumed to be particularly present in countries with a high degree of 
constitutional autonomy of sub-national jurisdictions. This problem has been present in 
Europe since the establishment of the Euro and the Stability and Growth Pact. Rules 
which were designed to commit EU member countries suffered from a deficient transpo-
sition in the federal context of member countries. In the current European debt crisis, 
governments are struggling to strengthen or regain market confidence through more 
credible fiscal rules such as agreed upon in the Fiscal Compact. But, here again, federal 
structures may complicate the establishment of consistent and credible fiscal institutions. 
Germany is a federal country for which these considerations are relevant, too, 
and is thus a promising case study. In 2009, Germany has introduced a new debt brake 
which aims at constraining the build-up of new public debt for both the federal and the 
state level. While the new rule is enshrined in the federal constitution, the Grundgesetz, 
the sixteen states have leeway on how to mirror these national rules in their state consti-
tutions and budgetary state laws. Although the Grundgesetz’ debt brake is immediately 
binding for the states as well, the individual state transposition could create quite a di-
verse set of effective fiscal rules across German states.  
It is the objective of this contribution to shed light on this issue and to ask to which 
extent German states’ debt rules differ. Germany is without doubt a particularly interest-
ing and important example of debt rule federalism since the German debt brake has had 
a strong impact on the design of the rules agreed upon in the Fiscal Compact. In our 
analysis we go beyond a mere qualitative description of institutional differences and de-
velop a quantitative indicator which expresses the strictness of the debt rules. The indi-
cator’s construction follows approaches developed in the current literature to compare 
the strictness of fiscal rules across countries. 
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Our results point towards a considerable heterogeneity of budgetary rules across 
German states in spite of the existence of the overall federal constitutional rule. For ex-
ample, states differ with respect to the legal basis of their debt rules, the rule’s precision, 
the chosen flexibility provisions and its comprehensiveness. Furthermore, only in the 
poorest states the rules’ credibility gains from effective sanction provisions as these 
states risk transfers if they do not adhere to the rules. This partially explains that, ac-
cording to our indicator, the strongest rules are to be found in financially weak states 
(Schleswig-Holstein, Saxony-Anhalt and Saarland). However, this advantage will expire 
in the year 2020 when the financial consolidation support ends. A possible reason for 
the lack of ambition in some states would point to the disincentives of German federal-
ism: Due to bailout-guarantees enshrined in German federalism, German states do not 
have incentives to impress bond markets through particularly strict budgetary rules.  
 The remainder of this paper is organised as follows: In section 2, we describe the 
new German constitutional debt brake. Section 3 summarizes the fiscal rules literature 
and derives the construction of our Strength of a Fiscal Rule Indicator. Section 4 pre-
sents the individual analyses for the German states and the indicator’s quantification. 
Section 5 summarizes the results and draws some conclusions. 
2. The German debt brake 
In 2009 Bundestag and Bundesrat decided to implement a stricter budget rule in the 
federal constitution (Grundgesetz, GG). It includes constraints on the level of the struc-
tural deficit for both the federal government (deficit must not exceed 0.35% of the GDP, 
binding from 2016 onwards) and the states (deficit must be zero or in surplus from 2020 
onwards, Art. 143d (1) GG). Since in principle the rule prohibits new net borrowing it is 
called “debt brake”. 
The so called “Stability Council” monitors compliance with the budget rules and 
with the regulations according to the Consolidation Assistance Act (Konsolidi-
erungshilfengesetz, KonsHilfG, based on Art. 109a GG). The Council comprises the fi-
nance ministers of each state, the federal ministers of finance and of economic affairs. 
Every state and the federal government have one vote each; the federal ministers share 
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one vote. However, the federal government has a veto: decisions require a two-thirds 
majority of the states and the vote of the federal government. Decisions can concern the 
definition of common measures and benchmarks or the official identification of a rule 
violation by a member. In the latter case, the Council member representing the violator – 
a state or the federal government – has no voting right. In case of an identified violation, 
the Council sets up a stability programme together with the respective government and 
monitors its enforcement. 
However, the Stability Council does not dispose of means to sanction misbehav-
iour, only for those states that receive temporary financial assistance. These states are 
considered not to be able to achieve a balanced budget in 2020 on their own, these are: 
Berlin, Bremen, Saarland, Saxony-Anhalt and Schleswig-Holstein (Art. 143d (2) GG). In 
return, the states agreed to reduce their structural deficit1 along yearly decreasing limits 
(§ 2 (1) KonsHilfG). If a state does not comply with these limits, financial support is cut 
off (§ 1 (3) sentence 3 KonsHilfG). Each, the federal government and all states – includ-
ing those receiving financial support – pay half of the total yearly amount of 800 Mio. 
Euro (Art. 143d (3) GG). 
The German debt brake has been discussed controversially among scholars of 
economics and law. On the one hand the rule is regarded as a step forwards: compared 
to its predecessor the new rule is considered to be “balanced and effective” (Feld, 2010, 
p. 241). Up to the 2009 reform the German constitution prescribed a ‘golden rule’ with 
net borrowing limited to the level of gross public investment.2 Its effectiveness was mas-
sively impaired by the existence of a very general escape clause: declaring a ‘macroe-
conomic disequilibrium’ was sufficient to legitimate a violation of the general principle. 
Since any significant level of unemployment, trade balance, inflation or poor growth was 
sufficient for such an assessment the old rule has not been an effective constraint. Be-
tween 1991 and 2005 the federal level missed the golden rule in seven and the states in 
68 cases (Feld, 2010, p. 232). With this reference point, the new debt brake is clearly 
                                                 
1  The calculation of the structural deficit is defined in Consolidation Assistance Act (§ 2 (1) KonsHilfG) and the respective Adminis-
trative Agreements (the Verwaltungsvereinbarung (VV) KonsHilfG). The KonsHilfG defines the organisation of the financial sup-
ports. Each federal state agrees to an individual administrative agreement with the federal ministry of finance (VV KonsHilfG). 
These agreements define in detail the calculation of the structural deficit, the process of support and possible sanctions following 
non-compliance. 
2    Some state budget rules still mirror this golden rule. In this context, the Budgetary Principles Act (Haushaltsgrundsätzegesetz, 
HGrG) determines the term ‘investments’ (HGrG Art. 20 (3) 2 sentence 2) and is still important for many budget rules in the 
states and for the federal government until 2015, too. The term ‘investment’ term is notoriously imprecise and has been inter-
preted extensively. 
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more precise with respect to the deficit ceiling (i.a. no need to define the term ‘invest-
ment’), the exception clauses and its surveillance.  
In spite of the progress made, compared to the pre-2009 situation also the new 
rule is far away from a perfect solution (Feld, 2010; Sturm, 2011): A shortcoming which 
is also admitted by principle defendants of the new rule is the missing availability of ef-
fective sanctions by the Stability Council. Any significant reform on this field would have 
required increasing tax autonomy of German states which could safeguard the ability to 
pay fines. Since an increase in revenue autonomy was not acceptable for numerous 
German states this precluded the establishment of effective monetary sanctions (beyond 
the implicit sanctioning of the consolidation assistance as mentioned). Apart from that, 
the Stability Council’s composition does not guarantee a really neutral and unbiased 
analysis since neutral representatives with voting rights (e.g. from the German Bundes-
bank) are missing. Furthermore, the ceilings for the budgeted deficits only refer to the 
central level and the state level and do not take account of deficits of the social security 
systems or the municipal level. Payments to both are part of the state budgets, but inde-
pendent borrowing by them is not. This offers leeway for ‘fiscal cosmetics’. Whereas the 
long transitory period between 2009 and 2020 serves as a legitimate strategy of a 
lagged reform implementation which is to overcome political-economic resistance prob-
lems of time inconsistency could arise as a consequence of the long transitory phase, 
too (Heinemann, 2010). The resistance against the new constraints is likely to grow until 
in 2020 the brake enters into force. 
Already this list of shortcomings clarifies that the new debt brake is not perfect so 
that states could, in principle, embark on a more stringent rule for their own budgetary 
constitution. Although the rules and procedures of the federal constitution bind the 
states, a state has scope for deciding on several details of implementation. At least the 
following degrees of freedom exist for the state level: 
- Method of structural adjustment: The constitution states that the annual public budg-
et of the states must be balanced without new borrowing “in principle” (Art. 109 (3) 
sentence 1 and 5 GG). The term “budget” is understood as the accounting balance 
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(“Finanzierungssaldo”3; Bundesbank, 2011: 16; Thye, 2010: 25-26). To implement 
this strict rule the constitution allows the states to define provisions to adjust the 
budgetary balance for business cycle developments in a “symmetric” way (Art. 109 
(3) sentence 2 GG). In an economic downturn, the state is allowed to borrow but 
must repay the extra debt in an economic upswing. The federal government has al-
ready decided on the method to calculate the budgetary structural adjustment it 
wants to use. This federal method is based on the one used by the European Com-
mission (Art. 109 (2) GG; § 5 (4) Law on GG Art. 115). Although, the states can 
choose their method independently, constraints exist for those five states that get fi-
nancial support. These states had to agree to use the same procedure of structural 
adjustment as the federal government. 
- Definition of extraordinary events: Moreover, the states can decide to allow borrow-
ing in case of natural catastrophes or extraordinary emergencies that originate out-
side the scope of control of the state and that affect the state’s budget considerably. 
In case of these events, the parliament must decide on a redemption plan organising 
the repayment of the extra debt in an adequate period of time (Art. 109 (3) sentence 
3 GG). 
- Comprehensiveness of budget definition: The states also have leeway in the precise 
definition of some of the crucial budgetary terms in the constitutional rule: The state’s 
core budget just needs to consider payments to and income from special assets or 
state owned enterprises (§ 18 Law on Budget Principles, HGrG). However, a state 
can decide to include in its budget also the budgets – thus new net borrowing – of 
special assets and state owned enterprises as well as those of the municipalities. 
Thus, there is an important dimension where state rules can make a substantive dif-
ference. Since the federal government does not consider ‘financial transactions’ such 
as buying or selling liabilities or shares of enterprises for the calculation of its balance 
(Art. 115 (2) sentence 5 GG; § 3 Law on GG Art. 115), a state could refer to this 
modification and claim it for itself, too. 
If the states do not change their budget rules, the federal constitution’s strict prohibition 
of no new net borrowing directly applies to the states (Art. 31 GG). However, the states 
                                                 
3  According to the HGrG the accounting balance considers all incomes and expenditures (including interest rate payments) except 
for those related to credit market borrowing, reserves, cash surpluses or deficits and income from coin sells (§ 10 (4) No 2). 
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are free to mirror the national rule in their constitutions or simple laws. Of course, they 
would also be able to go beyond the provisions of the Grundgesetz and to impose even 
stricter or more precise fiscal rules. Equally they could shorten the transitory period to-
wards a balanced budget. It is also worth mentioning that further room for state individu-
alism exists with respect to the chosen democratic procedures for the establishment of a 
state rule. States could organise a referendum on a new state rule which might boost its 
democratic legitimacy and, hence, its political power (see below for Hesse section 4.7).  
Summing up, although the federal constitution’s debt brake defines important new 
constraint for the state level there is sub-national leeway. This corresponds to the au-
tonomy of states under German federalism. Hence, it is of research interest to analyse 
and measure sub-national heterogeneity in fiscal rules. 
3.  Quantifying the strength and credibility of fiscal rules 
A budget rule aims at constraining a state’s budget in order to achieve and to maintain a 
sustainable budgetary stance. Moreover, a convincing budget rule can function as a sig-
nal of credibility to borrowers and bond markets (International Monetary Fund, 2009: 5) 
and may then contribute to limit interest rate spreads. Indeed, there is evidence on the 
empirical relevance of this channel: Iara and Wolff (2011) study the impact of fiscal rules 
on risk premia for the initial eleven Euro area countries for the years 1999 to 2009 in a 
panel estimation. The authors make use of the European Commission’s Fiscal Rule In-
dex (FRI, see below). They do not find a significant overall effect of fiscal rules on risk 
spreads, but they do find a significant impact if they interact the FRI with the general risk 
aversion of the financial markets. Thus, fiscal rules only have a negative effect on bond 
spreads in a market environment where risk sensitivity is high. Heinemann, Kalb and 
Osterloh (2011) extend the approach from Iara and Wolff by including proxies for a 
country’s stability culture. Thus, they test whether fiscal rules simply reflect a country’s 
risk preferences or whether they have a genuine impact. Their results point to the latter 
and to a particular potential of fiscal rules in countries with a historically low stability cul-
ture (measured e.g. on the basis of past inflation performance).  
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Indexes which quantify the strength of a budget rule try to capture this credibility 
potential of a rule. Assessing this potential reveals whether and to what extent fiscal ju-
risdictions constrain their budget policies effectively. Indexes may vary with regard to the 
categories chosen to analyse rules, what they measure and how precise, the weighting 
procedure, and how information on the categories is acquired.  
In order to compare the stringency of national rules across countries, two indexes 
have been developed by the European Union (EU; Directorate-General for Economic 
and Financial Affairs, 2006: 157ff.) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF; Interna-
tional Monetary Fund, 2009). The EU’s Fiscal Rule Index is built on two sub-indexes: the 
Fiscal Rule Coverage Index and the Index of Strength of Fiscal Rules. The first reflects 
the share of government expenditures covered by a rule. The second assesses the 
strength of this rule using five criteria (Directorate-General for Economic and Financial 
Affairs, 2006: 163f.): (1) the legal base of restrictions for changing the rule, (2) the de-
gree of political independence of the body that is in charge of the monitoring and (3) the 
enforcement of the rule, (4) enforcement mechanisms, and (5) the media coverage of 
the rule. These criteria are weighted randomly using a complex procedure to define a 
range where the index value would most probably lay in. In order to calculate the Fiscal 
Rule Index the share of a rule indicated by the Fiscal Coverage Index is multiplied by the 
Strength of Fiscal Rule Index. The coding for the EU Fiscal Rule Index is based on a 
survey of government experts in the EU member countries.   
The IMF index is based on seven scores: (1) enforcement, (2) coverage, (3) legal 
basis, (4) supranational rules, (5) monitoring and enforcement procedures, (6) flexibility, 
and (7) the average number of rules (International Monetary Fund, 2009: 8). The 
weighting is done using a principal component analysis.  
These indexes serve as a starting point for our quantification of fiscal rules in the 
German federal states. However, neither the EU nor the IMF quantification procedure is 
applicable to the sub-national level in Germany without further qualification. The com-
mon national environment of German states precludes any variance for some of the sub-
indexes. This holds, for example for media attention in the case of the EU index, or for 
monitoring and enforcement in the case of both the IMF and EU index. Furthermore, 
these existing indexes have some conceptual and methodological imperfections: con-
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ceptually, the EU index considers the qualitative type of a rule, but not its numerical am-
bition, for example, budget balance rules limiting the deficit to 3% or to 10% of GDP are 
equally ‘good’. Methodologically, the self-assessment of civil servants in responsible 
ministries is an obvious source of a distortion towards a too favorable assessment. 
 However, several criteria and elements of both indexes are helpful. We use them 
and create new ones to set up a specialised index to quantify the credibility of fiscal 
rules in the German federal states. Table 1 gives an overview of the index composition. 
Our index is based on a two-dimensional approach. First, we differentiate be-
tween four ‘parts’ of a rule and, second, between five ‘categories’. For the first dimen-
sion, we use the distinction made by Schaltegger and Frey (2004) between four parts of 
a rule: 
(1) the basic rule describes the aim of a budget rule, e.g. a balanced budget; 
(2) regulations describe details of this rule, how it should operate and to which parts 
of the budget it has to be applied; 
(3) relaxations describe conditions under which a state can deviate from the rule; 
(4) sanctions determine enforcement mechanisms to guarantee the implementation 
of the rule and to punish non-compliance. 
With respect to the second dimension, we use five categories to describe the formal na-
ture and the content of a rule. The aim is to mirror the credibility of a rule. The higher the 
credibility the higher the scores assigned. Four categories assess formal characteristics 
and one category tries to capture the precision and stringency of the rule’s content. 
 
 Table 1: Fiscal Rule Index for the German Federal States. 
Categories   Part of Rule Total Points Std. Points 
    Basic 
rule 
Regula-
tions 
Relaxa-
tions 
Sanc-
tions 
    
Description Short description of budget 
rule(s) in place 
                
                    
A Legal base 4: constitution           / 16 0,00 
    3: legal act                 
    2: coalition agreement                 
    1: political commitment by 
responsible authority (e.g. 
minister of finance) 
                
B Enforcement 
mechanisms 
4: automatic correction & 
sanction mechanisms 
          / 4 0,00 
    3: obligation to take cor-
rective measures, definitive 
sanctions 
                
    2: obligation to take cor-
rective measures or possi-
ble sanctions 
                
    1: no special actions                 
C Coverage 1 point per unity, max. 4           / 4 0,00 
  Official budget:            / 1 0,00 
   - shareholdings                  
   - debt claims by 
public authorities 
                 
   - granted loans                  
   - reserves                  
  Public enterprises            / 1 0,00 
  Special funds            / 1 0,00 
  Financial support 
for local authorities 
            / 1 0,00 
D Flexibility 1 point per unit, max. 4           / 4 0,00 
  Business cycle            / 1 0,00 
  Economic shocks            / 1 0,00 
  Other emergencies            / 1 0,00 
  Compensational 
mechanism 
            / 1 0,00 
E Content            / 20 0,00 
  Clear definitions 2: all terms           / 6 0,00 
    1: most of the terms                 
    0: few or no terms                 
  Strict aim 2: sufficiently strict legal 
provisions to realise the 
rule’s aim 
          / 6 0,00 
    1: quite strict provisions                 
    0: insufficient provisions                 
  Strict rule 2: stricter constraints than 
the federal rule 
          / 8 0,00 
    1: similar constraints                 
    0: less constraints                 
            Sum   / 48   
 Shaded area: Fields not applicable.         
      Index score 0,00 
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Categories A and B are adapted from the EU Fiscal Rule Index: 
(A) Category A, ‘Legal base’, assesses the legal background of a rule. The rating 
ranges from 1 to 4 where 4 is assigned for the strongest legal base. This is the 
one that can be changed the least easily. 
(B) Category B, ‘Enforcement mechanisms’, indicates whether there are provi-
sions guaranteeing enforcement and punishment in case of non-compliance. 
The rating ranges from 1 to 4 where 4 is assigned for mechanisms with the 
least political influence possible since political decisions are likely to bias initial 
objectives according to current situations.4 
Category C is based on the underlying idea of the EU Fiscal Rule Coverage Index. 
This index tries to assess the part of government expenditures that are covered by a 
budget rule. The more complete the coverage of expenditures the less opportunities 
exist to circumvent the rule by shifting expenditures from a covered to a non-covered 
part. In the adoption of this category, however, we do not follow the EU index’ exam-
ple which uses the share of total expenditure covered. This share might be vulnera-
ble to strong changes over time. The problem is that the expenditure share may ra-
ther quantify the effects of a rule rather than its content. For example, expenditures 
for establishing a special fund in one year might decrease the ratio of coverage but 
the score will increase in the next year although the rule did not get ‘better’. There-
fore, we set up another measure to assess the degree of coverage which is a count 
variable adding up the types of public expenditure covered by the rule: 
(C) Category C, ‘Coverage’, is calculated as a count variable which adds 1 point 
for each of the following kinds of total government budget which is covered by 
the fiscal rule under scrutiny: the official state budget (as decided by the par-
liament), state owned enterprises, special funds and financial support for local 
authorities. Thus, the rating ranges from 1 (only official state budget covered) 
to 4 (total government expenditures covered). 
Category D is inspired by the IMF index score for flexibility. To be credible a rule 
needs to be flexible to a certain degree. Otherwise one would expect the government 
to break or the legislative to change the rule as soon as compliance is not possible 
anymore. 
                                                 
4  In contrast to this category used in the EU-Index, we do not assign an additional point for an escape clause, since we exam-
ine this in a special category. 
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(D) Category D, ‘Flexibility’, considers three cases of flexibility: first; a continuous 
cyclical adjustment; second, provisions for exceptional economic shocks; and 
third, other emergencies like natural catastrophes, that lay outside of the 
scope of the government’s control. Finally, compensational mechanisms, for 
example through a redemption plan, are an important precaution to limit the 
dangers of flexibility provisions and to commit the budgetary authorities to cor-
rect the exceptional build-up of public debt. 1 point is assigned for each of the 
three flexibility cases and for the existence of a well-defined compensational 
mechanism.  
Categories A to D do not yet evaluate a fiscal rule’s precise contents. In order to ex-
amine its content, its precision and its stringency we construct category E, ‘Content’. 
(E) Category E, ‘Content’, consists of three parts. The first, ‘clear definitions’, ex-
amines whether key terms of the rule are clearly defined by law. Vague formu-
lations must then be defined within the day-to-day budgetary decision making 
or the judiciary and therefore let a large scope for interpretations and, hence, 
are more vulnerable to manipulations. If more than one third of the key terms 
are clearly defined, 1 point is assigned. If there are less, 0 points and if there 
are more than two-thirds, 2 points are assigned. 
The second part, ‘strict aim’, examines whether regulations, relaxations and 
sanctions of a budget rule are sufficiently strict to meet the aim laid down in 
the basic rule. Here, we qualitatively judge the content of a rule. If, for exam-
ple, the flexibility clauses – although existent and clearly defined – allow devia-
tions too often, it is hardly possible that the basic rule is followed regularly.5 
The rating ranges between 0 – no strict regulations – and 2 – regulations that 
are strict enough. 
The third part, ‘strict rule’, tries to judge the ambition of the rule. Taking the 
provisions of the federal debt brake as a reference point, the score ranges 
from 0 to 2. A rule that is as strict as the federal rule gets 1 point. A rule that is 
even stricter gets 2, a rule that is less strict 0 points. This measure takes into 
account that states could want to implement a stricter rule. Hereby, we can ac-
                                                 
5  Category D only assesses whether there are flexibility clauses. We consider them as a necessary part of a budget rule 
because they guaranty a certain stability of the budget rule. If there were no flexibility clauses the budget rule would be 
probably changed during an economic shock. However, the flexibility clauses should not allow too much flexibility; the budg-
et rule must be applied in ‘normal times’ to remain credible. Thus our indicator covers the full trade-off of flexibility: on the 
one hand a rigid rule is not credible, on the other hand flexibility must not lead to arbitrariness. 
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count for the quality of a rule without falling to normative judgements of ‘good’ 
or ‘bad’. The points assigned to each of the three parts sum up to the rating of 
category E. 
In order to follow the construction of the index’ score precisely, we first examine each 
of the four parts of a rule separately. All points of a category sum up across all parts 
and are translated into a percentage value. The mean of the percentage values of all 
categories form the index score. 
We would like to stress that this quantification approach can be applied to a 
state rule independently from its specific type, i.e. whether the rule refers to the 
budget balance, the stock of debt or the level of expenditure.6 In any case where a 
state has installed a combination of these different types we assess their joint opera-
tion since these rules interact and complement each other. 
Overall, the index is supposed to cover the dimensions which affect the credi-
bility of fiscal rules. Of course, this index suffers from the usual caveats of index con-
struction: the weighting is somehow arbitrary and while some index points can be 
assigned quite objectively, for others the assessment implies some subjectivity. 
4.  The German states’ fiscal rules: description and quantification 
The following chapter describes the states’ budget rules in detail and quantifies the 
index value for each of them applying the above defined method.7 All states base 
their budget laws on their constitution and State Budget Regulations (Landeshau-
shaltsordnung, LHO). The constitution is more difficult to change than the LHO which 
can be changed by simple majority. All states do not have specific sanctions for the 
budget rule. A parliamentary minority can take the budget plan – as every other bill – 
to the Constitutional Court, but this is no ‘automatic’ mechanism forcing the parlia-
ment to comply with the rules. Only states that receive financial support according to 
the KonsHilfG face the sanction of a cut off of the aid in case of non-compliance. This 
                                                 
6  The indexes of the EU (Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs, 2006: 151) and the IMF (International Mone-
tary Fund, 2009: 5f.) differentiate between: 
- a budget balance rule which determines a limit to the budget balance; 
- a debt rule which targets the stock of debt that has been accumulated up until a certain date; 
- an expenditure rule which limits the amount of expenditures or the growth of expenditures, and 
- a revenue rule which limits either the whole revenue magnitude or certain parts of it, e.g. tax income. 
 Revenue rules currently do not play a role in German states. 
7  An exemplary detailed construction sheet for Baden-Württemberg can be found in the Appendix, the full set of state sheets 
is available as web appendix: www.zew.de/debtrulesDP012-067 
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is an automatic mechanism but covers only a very small part of the budget. Further-
more, the states need to comply with the Budget Principles Act 
(Haushaltsgrundsätzegesetz, HGrG). This act prescribes how the budget needs to be 
designed and specifies the calculation of the term ‘budget’. However, the states are 
free to implement stricter rules. We do not consider declarations of intent in the mid-
term financial plans or similar documents since they are too easy to change and 
would therefore bias the index score. 8 
4.1 Baden-Württemberg (BW) 
Baden-Württemberg voted for the federal debt brake in the Bundesrat. Already in 
2007, Baden-Württemberg got a stricter budget rule. It was implemented in the LHO 
(Art. 18), whereas the constitution remained unchanged up until now.9 
Baden-Württemberg uses a combination of a balanced budget and a debt rule. 
”In principle” the budget must be balanced without borrowing (LHO Article 18 (1) sen-
tence 1). The credit market debt stock must not exceed the nominal debt level deter-
mined 31 December 2007 (41.7 billion €, Rechnungshof Baden-Württemberg, 2010: 
3). The revenue rule allows running deficits to respond to “demands of the macroe-
conomic equilibrium” or similar severe situations (LHO Art. 18 (2) sentence 1). The 
amount of borrowing must not exceed the sum of expenditures for investments (LHO 
Art. 18 (2) sentence 1). Borrowing above that limit is allowed in case of a “disturb-
ance of the macroeconomic equilibrium” (LHO Art. 18 (2) sentence 2). The parlia-
ment must clarify that this case exists or soon will and that borrowing will help to re-
pel it (LHO Art. 18 (2) sentence 2). Baden-Württemberg is allowed to exceed the debt 
limit if the tax income decreases by 1% compared to the preceding year and in case 
of natural catastrophes or similar severe emergencies (LHO Art. 18 (3)). If these ex-
ceptions come into use, the parliament must decide a redemption plan for at most 
seven years to pay the extra debt back (LHO Art. 18 (4)). 
Although the restrictions seem strict, some legal terms are not specified suffi-
ciently. The interpretation of a ‘disturbance of the macroeconomic equilibrium’ is up to 
the parliament’s simple majority and therefore vulnerable to manipulations. The same 
holds for the term ‘investments’ (vague definition in LHO Art. 13 (3) No 2 sentence 2, 
                                                 
8  See also German Council of Economic Experts (2011) for a survey of state transposition of the federal debt rule. 
9  At least two-thirds of the members of the parliament must be present and decide with a two-thirds-majority (that must in-
clude at least half of the parliament’s members). Also, the parliament can demand a referendum with a simple majority. Half 
of the people eligible to vote need to approve the bill (Constitution Art. 64 (2)). 
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same as in HGrG). Accepting deviations from the rules in case of a 1% tax income 
reduction seems like a reaction to business cycle developments, since 1% is not 
much. The rules do not apply to state owned enterprises, special funds (constitution 
Art. 79, LHO Art. 26 (2)) or recipients of grants (LHO Art. 28 (3)). Nonetheless, the 
budget rule is stricter than the one proposed by the Grundgesetz. The numerically 
determined debt stock will decrease in real terms because of inflation. The use of 
exception clauses must be followed by a complete redemption. Both elements seem 
to guarantee stable budgets and provide credibility. However, there are no strict en-
forcement mechanisms. Baden-Württemberg has an index score of 0.65. 
4.2 Bavaria (BY) 
Bavaria voted for the federal debt brake in the Bundesrat. In 2006, the State Budget 
Regulations (BayHO, simple law), but not the constitution10, got changed. Bavaria 
uses a budget balance rule. Borrowing is allowed in case of “extraordinary demands” 
(constitution Art. 84). The BayHo clarifies that the budget plan must be balanced 
“regularly” without borrowing (BayHO Art. 18 (1)). Borrowing is allowed to respond to 
“demands of the macroeconomic equilibrium” or similar severe situations. The maxi-
mal amount must not exceed the sum of expenditures for investments. Higher bor-
rowing is possible in case of a “disturbance of the macroeconomic equilibrium” (Bay-
HO Art. 19 (2)). 
The terms describing exceptions to BayHO Art. 18 (1) correspond to “extraor-
dinary demands” as determined by the constitution. However, no clear definition is 
given so that the exception is vulnerable to manipulations, because their interpreta-
tion is up to the parliament’s simple majority. The main aim is to set up balanced 
budgets, but only on a ‘regular’ basis. This term does not say anything about the time 
span of exceptions to this rule nor redemption arrangements . Also, the definition of 
“investments” (LHO Art. 13 (3) No 2 sentence 2, same as in HGrG) is not specified. 
The rule does not consider state owned enterprises, special funds or recipients of 
grants (LHO Art. 26). Nonetheless, the rule corresponds to the one the Grundgesetz 
specifies for the Bundesländer, but it suffers from imprecise definitions. The index 
score is 0.50. 
                                                 
10  The constitution can be changed by a two-thirds majority of all members of the parliament (constitution Art. 75 (2)). The bill 
must be approved in a referendum by a simple majority of all participants, which must be equivalent to at least a fourth of all 
people eligible to vote (constitution Art. 79 (1)). 
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4.3 Berlin (BE) 
Berlin abstained from the vote for the federal debt brake in the Bundesrat. The rea-
sons are quite similar to those expressed to keep the current legal provisions in Ber-
lin as they are.11 The government does not approve prohibiting borrowing – although 
it is up to the Bundesländer to define exception clauses – because there might be 
situations where borrowing could be necessary. Also, Berlin considers the financial 
support given to some states as too small (Berliner Abgeordnetenhaus, 2009). Berlin 
did not change its budget rule, yet. It is close to the former federal budget rule. 
Berlin has a budget balance rule. Borrowing is only allowed if other financial 
means are not “available” (constitution Art. 87 (2)). The amount of borrowing must not 
exceed the amount of expenditures for investments. Higher borrowing is allowed to 
respond to a “disturbance of the macroeconomic equilibrium” (constitution Art. 87 
(2)). The parliament must determine that the disturbance exists and that borrowing 
will help to repel it (LHO Art. 18 (1)). Since Berlin is a recipient of financial support 
according to KonsHilfG, it is forced to decrease its deficit to zero at least in 2020 (VV 
KonsHilfG). If Berlin does not comply with these limits and if there is no “exceptional 
situation” approved by the Stability Council, financial support is cut off (VV KonsHilfG 
Art. 6). Furthermore, the coalition agreed to reduce expenditures yearly by 0.3% 
(compared to the previous year, Finanzsenat Berlin, 2011). This expenditure rule is 
defined in a coalition agreement and implemented in the budget plan law. 
Berlin’s budget rule is hardly credible. Borrowing is allowed as long as other fi-
nancial means are not available. Thus, no reasons must be given to take loans. The 
limit is not clear, too, since 'investments” are not specifically defined (LHO Art. 13 (3) 
No 2 sentence 2, same as in HGrG). Also, the term ‘macroeconomic equilibrium’ and 
its disturbance are not specified. The rule does not consider special funds, state 
owned enterprises and recipients of grants (LHO Art. 26). The VV KonsHilfG is much 
more explicit and helps Berlin to gain credibility: if the government does not follow 
definite numerical deficit limits, the support is cut off. Thanks to the provisions in VV 
KonsHilfG Berlin gets an index score of 0.66. However, the financial support ends in 
2019 and then the index score will – if nothing changes – fall back to 0.46 in 2020. 
                                                 
11  Two-thirds of all parliament’s members can change the constitution (constitution Art. 100). Otherwise, the people of Berlin – 
at least 20.000 of those eligible to vote – could set up a petition for a referendum that must be approved by 7% of those eli-
gible to vote. Then, the referendum is approved if two-thirds of the participants and at least half of those that are eligible to 
vote voted for it (constitution Art. 63). 
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4.4 Brandenburg (BB) 
Brandenburg approved the federal debt brake in the Bundesrat, although it does not 
have similar legal provisions, yet.12 The budget rule in Brandenburg still resembles 
the former federal rule. Borrowing is allowed up to the amount of expenditures for 
investments (constitution Art. 103 (1) sentence 2). Hereby, the budget must consider 
“demands of the macroeconomic equilibrium“ and the “protection of natural living 
conditions of present and future generations” (constitution Art. 101 (1)). Higher bor-
rowing is allowed to respond to a “disturbance of the macroeconomic equilibrium” 
(constitution Art. 103 (1) sentence 3). Then, the parliament must determine that this 
disturbance exists and that borrowing will help to repel it (LHO Art. 18 (1)). 
As it is the case for all other Bundesländer having this kind of a budget rule, 
key terms (“investments”, “macroeconomic equilibrium”, its “demands” and “disturb-
ance”) are not clearly determined. However, Brandenburg defines the term “invest-
ments” more precise as expenditures that “maintain, extend or improve means of 
production of the whole economy” (VV-HS 3.2.1.1, LHO Art. 13 (3) No 2 sentence 2). 
The rule does not consider special funds, state owned enterprises or recipients of 
grants (constitution Art. 101 (2), LHO Art. 26). The index score is 0.53. 
4.5 Bremen (HB) 
Bremen voted for the federal debt brake in the Bundesrat, although it does not have 
a similar budget rule, yet.13 The current rule is close to the former federal budget rule. 
It is complemented by a budget balance rule according to VV KonsHilfG. Borrowing is 
allowed up to the amount of expenditures for investments (constitution Art. 131a sen-
tence 2). Higher borrowing is possible in case of a “disturbance of the macroeconom-
ic equilibrium” (constitution Art. 131a sentence 2). As it is the case in most states 
having this type of rule, the terms “investments” (vague definition in LHO Art. 13 (3) 
No 2 sentence 2, same as in HGrG), “macroeconomic equilibrium” and its “disturb-
ance” are not defined clearly. They let a lot of scope for interpretation. Also, the rule 
does not consider borrowing by special funds, state owned enterprises and recipients 
of grants (LHO Art. 26). According to KonsHilfG, Bremen has to comply with decreas-
                                                 
12  Two-thirds of the parliament´s members can change the constitution (constitution Art. 79). Also, the bill could be approved in 
a referendum. Two-thirds of all participants and at least half of those eligible to vote must vote for it (constitution Art. 78). 
13  The constitution can be changed by a two-thirds majority of the parliament’s members (constitution Art. 125 (3)). Also, the 
majority of the parliament’s members could request a referendum (constitution Art. 70 (1)). More than half of those people 
eligible to vote must vote in favour of the bill to approve it (constitution Art. 72 (2)). 
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ing structural deficit limits (VV KonsHilfG Art. 4). If it does not and if there is no “ex-
ceptional situation” approved by the Stability Council, financial support is cut off (VV 
KonsHilfG Art. 6). The current index score is 0.65, but will fall back to 0.45 in 2020. 
4.6 Hamburg (HH) 
Hamburg voted for the federal debt brake in the Bundesrat. In 2007, Hamburg got a 
stricter debt rule by simple law (LHO) – the constitution remained unchanged14 – but 
the parliament cancelled the rule that would have been binding from 2013 on in 
2012.15 A new rule is not decided, yet. The current rule is close to the former federal 
rule and allows borrowing up to the amount of expenditures for investments (constitu-
tion Art. 72 (1), LHO art. 18 (1)). Exceptions can be made in case of “extraordinary 
demands” (constitution Art. 72 (1)). The LHO specifies this term by allowing excep-
tions in case the “macroeconomic equilibrium” is disturbed (LHO Art. 18 (1)).  
The rule is not that strict. The use of exceptions must hardly be justified and 
the rule relies on unspecified terms like “investments” (LHO Art. 13 (3) No 2 sentence 
2; same as in HGrG), “macroeconomic equilibrium”, its “demands” and “disturbance”. 
The rule does not apply to special funds, state owned enterprises and recipients of 
grants (LHO Art. 26). The rule’s index score is 0.44. 
4.7 Hesse (HE) 
Hesse voted in favour of the federal debt brake in the Bundesrat. In 2011, a corre-
sponding constitutional amendment for Hesse has been decided by a referendum.16 
The new rule first applies in 2020 (constitution Art. 161). The LHO is valid until the 
end of 2012, a new version has not been decided, yet. The current rule is close to the 
former federal rule and allows borrowing up until the amount of expenditures for in-
vestments17 and beyond that in case of “extraordinary demands” (constitution Art. 
141). The index score for this rule is 0.50. 
                                                 
14  The constitution can be changed by a three-fourths majority of the parliament’s members and a two-thirds majority of the 
participants in a referendum (constitution Art. 51 (2)). The parliament has to approve the bill two times (with the named ma-
jorities) with a period of 13 days between both decisions (constitution Art. 51 (2)). Also, the people of Hamburg can initiate a 
petition for a referendum with 10.000 signatures of those that are eligible to vote. If the parliament does not approve the bill 
within four months, it must conduct a petition for a referendum. At least a twentieths of the people eligible to vote must ap-
prove the petition. In the referendum two-thirds of the people that participate in the vote and two-thirds of the votes repre-
sented in the current parliament must approve the bill (constitution Art. 50). 
15  HmbGVBl. Nr. 23, 08/06/2012, p. 204. 
16  70% of all participants approved the bill (Hessisches Statistisches Landesamt, 2011). To change the constitution, the par-
liament must approve the bill by simple majority and half of the voters in a referendum must vote for it (constitution Art. 123 
sentence 2). 
17  The constitution uses the term “advertising ends” (constitution Art. 141), what means quite the same as ‘investments’.  
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The new rule prescribes a balanced budget without borrowing “in principle” 
(constitution Art. 141 (1)). Exceptions are allowed to account for business cycle fluc-
tuations in a “symmetric” way (constitution Art. 141 (3)). This term implies that bor-
rowings must be balanced by surpluses across the business cycle. In case of natural 
catastrophes or extraordinary emergencies – situations which reasons must lay out-
side the scope of control of the state – borrowing above these limits is allowed (con-
stitution Art. 141 (4) sentence 1). The parliament must decide a redemption plan at 
the same time (constitution Art. 141 (4) sentences 2). The loans must be paid back in 
an “appropriate” period of time (constitution Art. 141 (4) sentences 3). 
The provisions of the old rule are vulnerable to manipulation, because key 
terms are not specified (“investments” (LHO Art. 13 (3) No 2 sentence 2, same as in 
HGrG) and “extraordinary demands”). The new rule is more precise. The basic rule 
as well as its exception clauses are mainly specified. Although the time span of the 
redemption plan may be vulnerable to manipulation, the term “appropriate” can be 
used for an appeal. This would not be the case if no time condition at all would have 
been prescribed. However, the rule does not consider special funds, state owned 
enterprises and recipients of grants (LHO Art. 26). The index of this rule is 0.66. 
4.8 Lower Saxony (NI) 
Lower Saxony voted in favour of the federal debt brake in the Bundesrat. However, it 
does not have a similar rule, yet.18 The current rule is close to the former federal rule. 
Borrowing is allowed up until the amount of expenditures for investments and debt 
conversion (constitution Art. 71 sentence 2). Exceptions are possible to respond to a 
“disturbance of the macroeconomic equilibrium” or to an “immediate threat to the nat-
ural living conditions” (constitution Art. 71 sentence 3). The parliament must define a 
situation as exceptional and make clear that borrowing will help to repel it (LHO Art. 
18 (1)). The budget rule is hardly credible, because key terms (“investments” (LHO 
Art. 13 (3) No 2 sentence 2, same as in HGrG), “disturbance of the macroeconomic 
equilibrium” and “immediate threat to the natural living conditions”) are not specified. 
The rule does not consider special funds, state owned enterprises and recipients of 
grants (LHO Art. 26). The index score is 0.51. 
                                                 
18  A two-thirds majority of the parliament’s members can change the constitution (constitution Art. 46 (3)). The people of Lower 
Saxony can change it by collecting signatures at least of a tenth of those people eligible to vote for a petition for a referen-
dum (constitution Art. 48). If the parliament does not approve that bill within six months, a referendum is held. At least half of 
the people eligible to vote must vote for it (constitution Art. 49). 
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4.9 Mecklenburg-West Pomerania (MV) 
Mecklenburg-West Pomerania abstained from the vote on the federal debt brake in 
the Bundesrat. The government of SPD and CDU has doubts about a prohibition of 
borrowing for the states in the federal constitution. Also, they argue that states would 
rather follow constrains that they decided themselves than externally prescribed 
ones. Financial support payments would initiate wrong incentives because their cal-
culation just considers the debt stock and not the efforts a state has made so far to 
reduce it, the economic situation and the financial strength of the state. Furthermore, 
the distribution of financial policy competencies between the federal level and the 
states is not settled, yet (Bundesrat, 2009: 244). The parliament of Mecklenburg-
West Pomerania implemented a new budget rule in the constitution in 2011.19 It will 
first apply in 2020 (constitution Art. 79a). The LHO is not renewed, yet. 
The current rule resembles the former federal debt rule: borrowing is allowed 
up to the amount of expenditures for investments and beyond that in case of a “dis-
turbance of the macroeconomic equilibrium” or an immediate threat to the “economic 
and labour market development”. The parliament has to justify the use of exceptions 
by defining the situation as exceptional and clarifying that borrowing will be helpful 
(constitution Art. 65 (2)). This rule’s index score is 0.46. 
According to the new rule (constitution Art. 65 (2)) the budget must be bal-
anced without borrowing “in principle”. Exceptions are possible to respond to busi-
ness cycle fluctuations in a “symmetric” way. These situations must be compared to 
several similar situations years ago. Exceptions can also be made to respond to nat-
ural catastrophes or exceptional emergencies that lay outside the scope of control of 
the state and affect the budget considerably. In both cases, the parliament must sim-
ultaneously set-up a redemption plan that regulates paying back the debt in an “ap-
propriate” period of time. 
The current rule is vulnerable to exploitations. Key terms (“investments” (LHO 
Art. 13 (3) No 2 sentence 2, same as in HGrG), “disturbance of the macroeconomic 
equilibrium” and a threat to the “economic and labour market development”) are not 
specified. The rule does not consider special funds, state owned enterprises or recip-
ients of grants (LHO Art. 26). The new rule does not consider them, too, but is stricter 
                                                 
19  The constitution can be changed by two-thirds of the parliament’s members (constitution Art. 56 (2)). Otherwise 120.000 
people can sign a petition for a referendum. If the parliament does not approve the bill within six months, a referendum is 
held. It is successful, if two-thirds of the participants and at least half of the people eligible to vote vote for it (constitution Art. 
60). 
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regarding the use of exception clauses and prescribes a redemption plan. Although 
the term ‘appropriate’ does not define a concrete period of time, the term helps to 
appeal the budget. The new LHO should define the term ‘business cycle’ and how 
the adaption can be made ‘symmetrically’. The new rule is more credible than the old 
one. Its index score is 0.65. 
4.10 North Rhine-Westphalia (NW) 
North Rhine-Westphalia voted in favour of the federal debt brake in the Bundesrat. 
However, its budget rule is similar to the former federal rule.20 Borrowing is allowed to 
respond to “demands of the macroeconomic equilibrium”. On a “regular basis” bor-
rowing must not exceed the amount of expenditures for investments (constitution Art. 
83 sentence 2). Higher borrowing is possible to respond to a “disturbance of the mac-
roeconomic equilibrium” (LHO Art. 18 (1)). In this case the parliament must define 
that the disturbance exists and that borrowing will help to repel it (LHO Art. 18 (1)). 
The rule is not strict, since key terms (“investments” (LHO Art. 13 (3) No 2 sentence 
2, same as in HGrG), “demands” and “disturbance of the macroeconomic equilibri-
um”) are not specified. Also, the rule does not consider special funds, state owned 
enterprises and recipients of grants (LHO Art. 26). The index score is 0.45. 
4.11 Rhineland-Palatinate (RP) 
Rhineland-Palatinate voted in favour of the federal debt brake in the Bundesrat. In 
2010, the parliament decided to implement a similar rule in its constitution.21 The rule 
first applies in 2020. The current rule is similar to the former federal rule: borrowing is 
allowed up until the amount of expenditures for investments. Exceptions can be 
made in order to respond to a “disturbance of the macroeconomic equilibrium” (con-
stitution Art. 117 sentence 2). The parliament must declare a situation as exceptional 
and give reasons that borrowing would help to repel it (LHO Art. 18 (1)).  
The new budget balance rule prescribes that the budget plan must be bal-
anced without borrowing (constitution Art. 117 (1)). Exceptions are allowed in order to 
balance income differences caused by business cycle fluctuations (constitution Art. 
                                                 
20  The constitution can be changed by a two-thirds majority of the parliament’s members (constitution Art. 69 (2)). The parlia-
ment can also decide a referendum. It is successful if at least half of the people eligible to vote participate in the vote and 
two-thirds of them vote for it (constitution Art. 69 (3)). 
21  The constitution can be changed by two-thirds of the parliament´s members or during a referendum that must be approved 
by at least half of the people eligible to vote. 
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117 (1) sentence 2 No 1), in case of natural catastrophes or similar severe emergen-
cies and to adapt – at most within four years – to changes of budget affecting laws 
(constitution Art. 117 (1) sentence 2 No 2). The parliament must declare a situation 
as exceptional (constitution Art. 117 (1) sentence 3) and simultaneously decide about 
a redemption plan (constitution Art. 117 (1) sentence 4). The budget rule considers 
liabilities of state owned enterprises, special funds and recipients of grants (constitu-
tion Art. 117 (3)). This is unique among German federal states. 
Whereas the current rule is vulnerable to manipulation since key terms (“in-
vestments” (LHO Art. 13 (3) No 2 sentence 2, same as in HGrG) and “disturbance of 
the macroeconomic equilibrium”) are not specified, the new rule hardly is, because it 
is very strict. The term ‘business cycle’ and the way the budget has to adapt to it are 
specified and will be defined in a new LHO. The new rule clearly defines exception 
clauses and prescribes a detailed redemption plan – although without a time limit. 
Contrarily to the new rule, the old one does not consider special funds, state owned 
enterprises and recipients of grants (LHO Art. 26). However, it is not clear, what 
budget the new rule targets (the overall budget or the one defined in the current LHO 
Art. 13 (4) No 2 which is the same as in HGrG). The parliament did not change the 
LHO according to the new rule, yet. The index score of the old rule is 0.46 whereas 
the new rule has the highest score among all federal states with 0.78. 
4.12 Saarland (SL) 
Saarland voted for the federal debt brake in the Bundesrat. However, Saarland still 
does not have a similar budget rule.22 Since it gets financial support according to 
KonsHilfG it must follow strict deficit limits. The current rule is similar to the former 
federal rule: borrowing is allowed up to the amount of expenditures for investments 
(constitution Art. 108 (2)). Exceptions are possible to respond to a “disturbance of the 
macroeconomic equilibrium” or in case of “extraordinary demands” (Art. 108 (2)). The 
parliament must define a situation as exceptional and make clear that borrowing will 
help to repel it (Art. 18 (1)). If the parliament borrows to respond to “extraordinary 
demands”, it needs to define a redemption plan (LHO Art. 18 (1) sentence 3). Fur-
thermore, Saarland must reduce its deficit along numerical limits to zero until 2020 
(VV KonsHilfG Art. 4). The concrete calculation of this deficit is determined in VV 
                                                 
22  Two-thirds of the parliament’s members can change the constitution (constitution Art. 101 (1)). The constitution cannot be 
changed by a referendum (constitution Art. 100 (4)). 
23 
  
KonsHilfG (VV KonsHilfG Art. 2 (1)). If Saarland does not comply with these limits 
and if there is no “exceptional situation” approved by the Stability Council, financial 
support is cut off (VV KonsHilfG Art. 6).  
Thanks to the provisions of VV KonsHilfG, Saarland’s budget rule gained cred-
ibility: key terms are defined, a third body monitors the enforcement and sanctions 
are possible. However, key terms of Saarland’s original rule (“investments” (LHO Art. 
13 (3) No 2 sentence 2, same as in HGrG, but specified for constructions in Annex 7 
to VV No 15.2 for LHO Art. 44), “disturbance of the macroeconomic equilibrium” and 
“extraordinary demands”) are not specified. Also, the time span the redemption plan 
must cover is not defined. The rule does not consider special funds, state owned en-
terprises or recipients of grants (LHO Art. 26). The current index score is 0.71, but 
will – if nothing changes – fall back to 0.57 in 2020 when financial support ends. 
4.13 Saxony (SN) 
Saxony voted for the federal debt brake in the Bundesrat. Already in 2008, Saxony 
implemented a stricter budget rule in the LHO – the constitution remained un-
changed.23 Like Baden-Württemberg Saxony uses a combination of a balance budg-
et and a debt rule. The budget must be balanced without borrowing and the debt 
stock must not exceed the one in 2008 (Art. 18 (1)). Borrowing up until the debt limit 
is allowed for expenditures for investments and beyond only in case of a “disturbance 
of the macroeconomic equilibrium” (LHO Art. 18 (2)). In the latter case, the parlia-
ment must determine the disturbance and justify that borrowing will help to repel it 
(LHO Art. 18 (2)). Borrowing above the debt limit is only allowed if tax income de-
creases by 3% compared to the preceding year or in case of natural catastrophes or 
similar severe situations with supra-regional impact (LHO Art. 18 (3)). In any case, 
the parliament must set-up a redemption plan that prescribes repayment within at 
most five years (LHO Art. 18 (4)). 
Saxony’s rule is strict, even though it is just implemented in the LHO. Although 
some key terms (“investments” (LHO Art. 13 (3) No 2 sentence 2, same as in HGrG), 
“disturbance of the macroeconomic equilibrium”; “natural catastrophes” and “similar 
severe situations” are quite well defined, they must be supra-regional) are not speci-
                                                 
23  A two-thirds majority of the parliament’s members can change the constitution (constitution Art. 74 (2)). Also, the parliament 
can decide with a simple majority to conduct a referendum. The people of Saxony can demand a referendum, too, if they get 
at least 450.000 signatures of those people that are eligible to vote (constitution Art. 72 (2)). At least a simple majority of 
those people eligible to vote need to approve the bill (constitution Art. 74 (3)). 
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fied, the balanced budget and debt limits will decrease the probability of exploitations. 
The parliament has to justify its decisions and these can easily be appealed at the 
Constitutional Court. However, the rule does not consider special funds, state owned 
enterprises and recipients of grants (LHO Art. 26). The index score is 0.67. 
4.14  Saxony-Anhalt (ST) 
Saxony-Anhalt voted in favour of the federal debt brake in the Bundesrat. In 2010, 
the parliament changed the LHO to implement a stricter budget rule – the constitution 
remained unchanged.24 Since Saxony-Anhalt receives financial support according to 
KonsHilfG, it must follow strict deficit limits. The budget plan must be balanced with-
out borrowing (Art. 18 (1)). Exceptions are possible in order to adapt to serious busi-
ness cycle fluctuations, natural catastrophes or extraordinary emergencies that elude 
the scope of the state’s control (Art. 18 (2)). Simultaneously, the parliament must ap-
prove a redemption plan that prescribes the repayment in an “appropriate” scope of 
time (Art. 18 (3)). Additionally, the debt stock must decrease regularly (Art. 18 (4)). 
Furthermore, Saxony-Anhalt must reduce its deficit along numerical limits onto zero 
until 2020 (VV KonsHilfG Art. 4). The concrete calculation of this deficit is determined 
in VV KonsHilfG (VV KonsHilfG Art. 2 (1)). If Saxony-Anhalt does not comply with 
these limits and if there is no “exceptional situation” approved by the Stability Council, 
financial support is cut off (VV KonsHilfG Art. 6). 
All rules taken together constrain the financial scope of the parliament consid-
erably. The VV KonsHilfG specifies the terms ‘balanced budget’ and ‘business cycle 
developments’. The requirement to decrease the debt burden continuously limits 
possible exploitations and is exceptional among the states. However, the time span 
of a redemption plan is not defined and the rule does not consider special funds, 
state owned enterprises or recipients of grants (LHO Art. 26). The index score is 0.77 
but will fall back to 0.65 in 2020 when financial support has ended. 
4.15 Schleswig-Holstein (SH) 
Schleswig-Holstein abstained from the vote on the federal debt brake in the Bundes-
rat. The government had doubts whether the rule was in line with the federal constitu-
                                                 
24  A two-thirds majority of the parliament’s members can change the constitution (constitution Art. 78 (2)). The people of Saxo-
ny-Anhalt can demand a referendum with an eleventh of all people eligible to vote (constitution Art. 81 (1)). In the referen-
dum, two-thirds of the voters and at least half of those eligible to vote need to approve the bill (constitution Art. 81 (5)). 
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tion (GG Art. 109 (1) and Art. 20 (1)), because it would strongly interfere with the 
states’ financial competencies.25 Also, there is no solution found yet to cope with the 
accumulated debt stocks of the states. Prohibiting borrowing without settling this 
problem did not seem reasonable to the government. However, the coalition cam-
paigned for strict budget rules that must be implemented in the states’s constitutions. 
In 2010, Schleswig-Holstein’s parliament decided to implement a stricter rule in the 
constitution26 which would be binding from 2020 on. In 2012 the parliament decided a 
respective implementation law.27 Moreover, Schleswig-Holstein receives financial 
support according to KonsHilfG and therefore must comply with decreasing deficit 
limits until 2020 (VV KonsHilfG). 
The current rule is a budget balance rule. “In principle” the budget must be 
balanced without borrowing (constitution Art. 53 (1)). Borrowing is possible in order to 
respond to business cycle fluctuations in a “symmetric” way (constitution Art. 53 (2), 
detailed prescriptions in the implementation law § 1). In case of natural catastrophes 
or extraordinary emergencies that lay outside the scope of the state’s control and that 
affect the budget considerably, borrowing is possible if two-thirds of the parliament’s 
members agree. Simultaneously, they must determine a redemption plan that pre-
scribes the repayment of the debt within an “appropriate” scope of time (constitution 
Art. 53 (3)). Deviations from the planned and the implemented budget will be noted 
on a “control account” (implementation law § 8). If the accounting balance exceeds a 
specific threshold it must be reduced, but with respect to the business cycle. There-
by, Schleswig-Holstein is the first state that mirrors the federal level’s control account. 
Transitional provisions between 2011 and 2019 allow borrowing up to yearly decreas-
ing limits28 (constitution Art. 59a (1)). These regulations go in line with VV KonsHilfG 
(Art. 2 (1) and (4)). If Schleswig-Holstein does not comply with these limits and if 
there is no “exceptional situation” approved by the Stability Council, financial support 
is cut off (VV KonsHilfG Art. 6). 
The budget rule is strict: all regulations are implemented in the constitution, 
most of the key terms are defined (“In principle” considers the named exceptions, 
“budget” means the structural balance as defined in VV KonsHilfG, “natural catastro-
                                                 
25  Schleswig-Holstein brought this issue to the Federal Constitutional Court in 2010, but it was rejected because of formal 
reasons. 
26  Two-thirds of the parliament’s members must approve a constitutional amendment. Also, 5% of the people eligible to vote 
can demand a referendum. Two-thirds of the voters must approve the bill, at least half of those eligible to vote (constitution 
Art. 42). 
27  Gesetz zur Ausführung von Artikel 53 der Verfassung des Landes Schleswig-Holstein, 29/03/2012. 
28  The limits target the structural deficit from 2010 on. The limit for one year decreases by 10% compared to the preceding 
year. 
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phes” and “extraordinary emergencies” must be defined by two-thirds of the parlia-
ment’s members) and there are very strict deficit limits. However, it is not specified 
how a “symmetric” adaption to business cycle developments would work. The rule 
does not consider special funds, state owned enterprises (constitution Art. 50 (1)) 
and recipients of grants (LHO Art. 26). The index score is 0.78. Although it will fall 
back to 0.67 in 2020 when financial support has ended, it is still among the highest. 
4.16 Thuringia (TH) 
Thuringia voted for the federal debt brake in the Bundesrat. In 2009, the parliament 
decided to implement a stricter debt rule in the LHO – the constitution remained un-
changed.29 The LHO prescribes a budget balance rule. The budget must be balanced 
without borrowing (LHO Art. 18 (1)). If the total income is less than the average of the 
last three years, borrowing is allowed up to the amount of income the budget plan 
had foreseen. Higher borrowing is allowed in case of natural catastrophes or extraor-
dinary emergencies (LHO Art. 18 (2)). Simultaneously, the parliament must decide a 
redemption plan that prescribes the repayment within five years (LHO Art. 18 (3)). 
Additionally, expenditures for the personnel must not exceed 40% of the total ex-
penditures (constitution Art. 98 (3)). The rule is strict: borrowing is constrained and 
redemption is mandatory. However, the rule does not consider special funds, state 
owned enterprises and recipients of grants (LHO Art. 26). The index score is 0.66. 
5. Comparison 
There is a significant variance of the strength of budget rules among the German 
federal states according to our index quantification. The index scores range between 
0.44 and 0.78. The table below displays all index scores. 
Currently, Schleswig-Holstein (0.78) has the strongest rule, followed by Saxo-
ny-Anhalt (0.77) and Saarland (0.71). All three states receive financial support. Also, 
Berlin (0.66) and Bremen (0.65), the two other recipients of support, range in the up-
per half. In contrast, from 2020 on, when the support is cut off, they score mostly in 
the lower half – except for Schleswig-Holstein (0.67) and Saxony-Anhalt (0.65) which 
                                                 
29  The constitution can be changed by two-thirds of the parliament’s members (constitution Art. 83 (2)). Also, an eighth of the 
people eligible to vote can demand a referendum (constitution Art. 82 (5) sentence 2). In the referendum, a simple majority 
of the voters and at least 40% of those eligible to vote must approve the bill. 
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already implemented a stricter budget rule. The temporary relative strength of these 
states is explained by the fact that they face monetary sanctions in the period up to 
2020. The sanction threat results from the conditionality of the financial consolidation 
support and ends with these payments in 2019. 
Table 2: Index scores of the German federal states. 
Federal 
State 
Current 
Rule 
KonsHilfG 
- recipient 
 Federal 
State 
Future 
Rule1 
KonsHilfG 
- recipient 
 
SH 0.78 *  RP 0.78   
ST 0.77 *  SN 0.67   
SL 0.71 *  SH 0.67 * 
SN 0.67    HE 0.66   
BE 0.66 *  TH 0.66   
TH 0.66    BW 0.65   
BW 0.65    MV 0.65   
HB 0.65 *  ST 0.65 * 
BB 0.53    SL 0.57 * 
NI 0.51    BB 0.53   
BY 0.50    NI 0.51   
HE 0.50    BY 0.50   
MV 0.46    BE 0.46 * 
RP 0.46    HB 0.45 * 
NW 0.45    NW 0.45   
HH 0.44    HH 0.44   
Average 0.59   Average 0.59  
1 BE, HB, HE, MV, RP, SL, ST, SH: 2020. 
A green marking indicates that a new rule, according to the federal debt brake, has been implemented in the 
state’s constitution, a yellow marking that only the LHO changed, and no marking shows that a new rule has 
not been implemented, yet. 
 
At present, Hamburg (0.44) has the weakest rule of all states, closely followed 
by North Rhine-Westphalia (0.45), Rhineland-Palatinate (0.46), Mecklenburg-West 
Pomerania (0.46), Hesse (0.50), Bavaria (0.50), Lower Saxony (0.51) and Branden-
burg (0.53). Until now, all these states have a rule similar to the former federal rule. 
They differ only because of more or less specified key terms defining the rule. 
From 2020 on, Rhineland-Palatinate (0.78) has the strongest rule, followed by 
Saxony (0.67), Schleswig-Holstein (0.67) and Hesse (0.66). Rhineland-Palatinate, 
Schleswig-Holstein and Hesse implemented the rule in their state constitutions. What 
makes Rhineland-Palatinate outstanding is that its rule also covers special funds and 
public enterprises. This raises the index scores significantly. 
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States with financial support currently score well but fall back in 2020. The 
temporary improvement of their rules’ credibility is mainly a result of consolidation 
transfers’ conditionality. All states that changed their constitution range in the upper 
half once the constitutional change has become effective. Many states implemented 
a new rule by simple law; they could improve their index score significantly by intro-
ducing it into the constitution. Hamburg impressively showed the shortcomings of 
simple law: they abolished a new budget rule written down in the LHO and foreseen 
for 2013 in 2012. They could not have done this without the opposition’s support if 
the rule has been implemented in the constitution. Another rather simple way to im-
prove the index score is to take account of all flexibility cases and to define key terms 
precisely. Extending the coverage of the rule may be politically courageous but bene-
ficial for the rule’s credibility – as Rhineland-Palatinate demonstrates. 
Interestingly, credible future rules are by no means confined to wealthy states. 
A number of poorer states which are recipients in Germany’s fiscal equalization sys-
tem have opted for strict rules to improve their budgetary credibility. And contrary, 
some of the wealthier states are among those with the less ambitious rules. 
6. Conclusions 
This German case study confirms the expectation that national debt rules may not be 
able to guarantee a homogeneous set of effective fiscal rules across sub-national 
jurisdictions. In federal countries like Germany the states have constitutional and fis-
cal autonomy and make use of it also with respect to the definition and specification 
of a debt brake – the difference between the state with the lowest (Hamburg) and the 
one with the highest index score (Rhineland-Palatinate) is 0.34 for the future rule. 
The detailed analysis reveals striking details: Some states that are heavily in-
debted or receive financial support do not show much ambition so far. Among the five 
states that receive consolidation aid payments, only Saxony-Anhalt and Schleswig-
Holstein implemented a stronger rule to meet the federal debt brake requirements. 
The three other countries’ rules benefit from a temporary sanction threat. However, 
this rule strengthening element is temporary and exposed from outside because it is 
an implication of the federal debt brake. 
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Thus, some of the highly indebted states miss the chance of using their own 
legislation to make their fiscal regime more credible. This observation is in line with 
well-known disincentives of German federalism. Germany’s federal jurisdictions form 
a full bail-out-community. On constitutional grounds, states can be certain that they 
will be bailed out in case of insolvency. As a consequence, states’ bond yields do not 
differ to any significant extent and there are no incentives to regain capital reputation 
through better rules. Any such signal does not pay off in terms of financing costs but 
it may produce political costs. In this sense, the German experience is another ex-
ample of the general disincentives related to federal institutions based on mutual 
bailout promises. In the light of the upcoming discussions regarding German fiscal 
federal institutions, these results should be kept in mind.  
Finally, our results are of relevance for all attempts to improve fiscal govern-
ance in the euro area through new prescriptions like the Fiscal Compact or the re-
formed Stability and Growth Pact. A particular attention in the implementation of all 
these new rules has to be given to the federal dimension. Germany is a clear exam-
ple, where a seemingly unequivocal country-wide deficit rule does not necessarily 
create a level budgetary playing field across all sub-national jurisdictions, although 
judicial ties are a lot stronger than they are at the supranational, European level.  
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Appendix 
Exemplary Index score calculation for Baden-Württemberg 
(The full set of state sheets is available as web appendix: www.zew.de/debtrulesDP012-067) 
 
Categories Part of Rule Total Points Std. 
Points    Basic rule Regulations Relaxations Sanctions 
A Legal base BBR: constitution Art. 79 
(1) sentence 2, LHO Art. 
18 (1); DR: LHO Art. 18 
(1) 
BBR: constitution Art. 79, LHO 
Art. 18 (1) and Art. 26; DR: 
LHO Art. 18 (1) 
BBR: constitution Art. 84 sen-
tence 2, LHO Art. 18 (2); DR: 
LHO Art. 18 (2) and (3) 
Constitution Art. 68 (2) No 2; 
Stability Council: Federal con-
stitution Art. 109a sentence 1 
No 2, StabiRatG 
13 / 16 0,81 
    3 3 3 4         
B Enforcement me-
chanisms 
      There are no specific sanctions 
(valid for every bill), the Sta-
bility Council only monitors the 
enforcement but cannot sanc-
tion defections or impose cor-
rective measures 
1 / 4 0,25 
          1         
C Coverage   1,75     1,75 / 4 0,44 
  Official budget:   0,75     0,75 / 1 0,75 
   - shareholdings   1             
   - debt claims by 
public authorities 
  1             
   - granted loans   1             
   - reserves   0             
  Public enterprises   0     0 / 1 0,00 
  Special funds   0     0 / 1 0,00 
  Financial support for 
local authorities 
  1     1 / 1 1,00 
D Flexibility   1 3   4 / 4 1,00 
  Business cycle   1     1 / 1 1,00 
  Economic shocks     1   1 / 1 1,00 
  Other emergencies     1   1 / 1 1,00 
  Compensational 
mechanism 
    1   1 / 1 1,00 
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E Content 2 5 5 3 15 / 20 0,75 
  Clear definitions   Borrowing: 2 (speficied in 
HGrG) 
Disturbance of the macroeco-
nomic equilibrium: 1 (not spec-
ified, but the disturbance and 
that borrowing will help to 
repel it must be defined by 
law) 
Legal provisions are clearly 
defined 
        
      In principle: 0 (referring to 
business cycle fluctuations: 
"demands of the macroeco-
nomic equilibrium", also "simi-
lar severe situations") 
Natural catastrophe: 2 (not 
specified in detail but general 
understanding, use must be 
justified) 
          
      Investments: 1 (vague defini-
tion in LHO Art. 13 (3) No 2 
sentence 2) 
Similar severe emergencies: 1 
(not specified, but use must be 
justified) 
          
      Debt stock in 2007: 2 
(definititve  numerical value) 
Redemption plan: 2 (clear 
definition of time span and 
amount of debt that must be 
payed back) 
          
      Permanently: 2 (referring to 
"tax income decrease", but 
time span not specified) 
            
      Redemption plan: 2 (clear 
definition of time span and 
amount of debt that must be 
payed back) 
            
      2 2 2 6 / 6 1,00 
  Strict aim   1 1 0 2 / 6 0,33 
  Strict rule 2 2 2 1 7 / 8 0,88 
          Sum  34,75 / 48   
     Index score 0,65 
 
